[IRP] [charter] right to life liberty and security of person --- relevant for internet governance

M.I.Franklin M.I.Franklin
Wed Oct 21 14:48:20 EEST 2009


Dear All,

These issues are very complex to put it lightly. Here's how I understand it 
for the moment; transcribing (as we have been doing) the UDHR in writing a 
Charter on Internet-based rights and principles is distinct from inventing 
'new' rights that pertain primarily to the internet, broadly defined. 
However, there are clearly issue-areas specific to the internet that either 
diverge from or amplify those rights enshrined in the UDHR. A difficult 
balancing act at the best of times as this recurring discussion indicates.

However, Olivier's example about the technological imperative that is being 
put in place as more and more public services go online/become automated 
computerised services begs a question in these discussions about whether or 
not we should work up an explicit clause about a fundamental - universal - 
right to internet access, over and above freedom of speech etc (see Shaila 
and Anja).

Whilst I empathise, the question that goes begging is whether the internet 
(again, however defined!) is at present *universally* available. It is not. 
That said, if the next call (IGF, WSIS< all the rest) is to 'connect the 
next billion' this recalls earlier tussles around ' universal access' in 
telephony (if I'm correct). That is as yet not the case either, at least 
not in the fullest sense of the term 'universal'.

Back to the internet; the trend Olivier points to is a fact of life in 
richer regions (read OECD) which ipso facto have high ICT penetration. So, 
here, this charter may well be in the process of constructing new rights 
*despite* attempts not to be seen doing so (lisa's word of caution here). 
In other words, we could consider this case in terms of a pre-emptive 
strike (forgive the term) given that the UDHR was created in pre-internet 
times.

Where does this leave the charter at present? For me it presents us with 
some strategic decisions for the short-term (e.g. Lisa, Emily) about 
sticking with what we know (UDHR vs. new rights). BUT, does this preclude 
us from thinking ahead in order to pre-empt exclusion and 
disenfranchisement that are already being put in place by virtue of the 
internet *not* being as yet universally available, let alone 
accessed/accessible (Anja, Shaila, Olivier)? I hope this does not preclude 
us from being ahead of the ball because, like it or not, some rights and 
principles may indeed need to be invented i.e. created anew.

Hope that's clear because I'm still thinking the implications here through. 
Forgive me if it isn't.

cheers
MF

--On 21 October 2009 12:52 +0200 Andrea Glorioso <andrea at digitalpolicy.it> 
wrote:

> Dear all,
>
> I apologise for  chiming in so late  in the discussion.  I do hope I'm
> using the correct medium for the following comment(s).
>
> Please also bear  with my usual  disclaimer, i.e. although I  work for
> the   European   Commission (dealing   specifically   with policies on
> "Internet   Governance", "Network         and  Information  Security",
> "Fundamental Rights on the Internet") here I am writing in my personal
> capacity.
>
>>>>>> "max" == Max Senges <maxsenges at gmail.com> writes:
>
>     >     Hi Shaila Thanks for your input. I  understand and support >
>     >     your  point that the right to   life liberty and security of
>     >     person > is possibly  the most fundamental  of them all, but
>     >     is it really > necessary to point out that that is also true
>     >     on the internet?
>
>     >     In my view this right does not need an explanation regarding
>     >     > what it means on the net. It is straight forward.
>
>     >     It would be good to hear other opinions.
>
> My  understanding  of the process  is that  the  first section of this
> Charter is supposed to "elaborate on  what [UDHR rights] *mean* in the
> context of the internet".
>
> Therefore, it seems to me that the point  is not whether the rights to
> life, liberty  and security (of person) apply   on the Internet  - the
> answer is  obviously yes.  The  real  question seems to be  how  their
> application/enforcement should be  framed when related  activities are
> exercised on the Internet.
>
> If my understanding is correct, then I would  like to stress that many
> policy-making  organisations  have     been framing  the    concept of
> "[Internet]  security"  in a  rather   dichotomic way vis-?-vis  other
> fundamental   rights.     The usual   "security   vs  privacy" (false)
> opposition is but one example of this kind of approach.
>
> Stressing  that "security" (on  the Internet) is  first and foremost a
> tool to  achieve a fundamental right  makes it clear that any approach
> on these   matters must be  duly  substantiated (why   do we need more
> "security"?),  appropriate to the goal  at  hand (do we really achieve
> more security by centralising key  decision-making powers on  Internet
> infrastructures?) and proportional (do  we really want to  monitor all
> traffic of all Internet users to catch up the bad guys and protect the
> good guys?).  And so on.
>
> Incidentally, making a    strong point that discourses  on  "security"
> should be  framed  (at   the very  least  *also*)  in  terms  of   the
> fundamental right  to security  of persons  makes  the work of certain
> officers in policy-making organisations much easier, believe me. ;)
>
> On a more substantive side, I would  strongly argue against making any
> specific example of  security-related  policies  or problems  in   the
> actual text.  Technology changes very rapidly and what is the hysteria
> of today becomes the fad of yesterday in the blink of an eye.
>
> Hope this is a useful contribution to the debate.  I'm at disposal for
> any clarification.
>
> Thanks, ciao,
>
> --
>       Andrea Glorioso || http://people.digitalpolicy.it/sama/cv/
>           M: +32-488-409-055         F: +39-051-930-31-133
>   * Le opinioni espresse in questa mail sono del tutto personali *
>       * The opinions expressed here are absolutely personal *
>
> 	"Constitutions represent the deliberate judgment of the
>      people as to the provisions and restraints which [...] will
> 	secure to each citizen the greatest liberty and utmost
> 	       protection. They are rules proscribed by
> 	         Philip sober to control Philip drunk."
> 			   David J. Brewer (1893)
>        An Independent Judiciary as the Salvation of the Nation



Dr Marianne Franklin
Reader/Convener of the Transnational Communications & Global Media Program
Media & Communications
Goldsmiths, University of London
New Cross
London SE14 6NW
United Kingdom
Tel (direct): #44 (0)207 919-7072
Fax: #44 (0) 207 919-7616
email: m.i.franklin at gold.ac.uk
http://www.goldsmiths.ac.uk/media-communications/staff/franklin.php
http://www.goldsmiths.ac.uk/pg/ma-transnational-communications-global-media.php




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